Overlapping generations economy, environmental externalities, and taxation

We have found that a steady state competitive equilibrium is dy-namically inecient when the capital ratio exceeds the golden ruleratio. In this section, we examine how to implement tax and/ortransfer policies in order to achieve the optimal allocation in thelong run for economies whose competitive equilibrium is dynami-cally inecient. Ono (1996) and Gutiérrez (2008) introduced sometaxes and transfer schemes to decentralize the rst best steady statein the context of pollution externalities. However, their schemes mayonly hold when the economy already is at the rst best steady state.In other words, when the economy is at the rst best steady stateat some point of time their taxes and transfer policies will help touphold this state.

We have found that a steady state competitive equilibrium is dy-namically inecient when the capital ratio exceeds the golden rule

ratio. In this section, we examine how to implement tax and/or

transfer policies in order to achieve the optimal allocation in the

long run for economies whose competitive equilibrium is dynami-cally inecient. Ono (1996) and Gutiérrez (2008) introduced some

taxes and transfer schemes to decentralize the rst best steady state

in the context of pollution externalities. However, their schemes may

only hold when the economy already is at the rst best steady state.

In other words, when the economy is at the rst best steady state

at some point of time their taxes and transfer policies will help to

uphold this state.

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